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Abstract After Husserl’s transcendental turn and the discovery of the correla-
tion between consciousness and the world the concept of the noema becomes 
one of the constant leitmotifs of Husserl’s philosophy. My paper will be devoted 
to the clarification of this concept and its implications for Husserl’s theory of 
sense. The leading question will be: How can the noema play the role of both 
the sense and the objective correlate of the intentional act? I will start with 
presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl’s phenomenology from the Log-
ical Investigations to the Ideas I. The central part of my paper will be devoted to 
the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noema. Finally, I intend 
to point out the most important ways in which the notion of the noema becomes 
enriched in later Husserl’s philosophy, as well as the difference between linguisit-
ic and non-linguistic sense, based on the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active 
Synthesis. I hope to show that Husserl’s phenomenological theory of sense offers 
a valuable alternative to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.
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Introduction
Studying intentionality as the essential characteristic of consciousness is 
the main task of phenomenology, according to Husserl.1 Moreover, as we 
become aware in the phenomenological reduction, intentionality is itself a 
structure composed of noesis and noema – intentional act and its objective 
correlate. It is through these notions that Husserl in his mature period deals 
with complex problems of how consciousness bestows sense on objects.
My paper will be devoted to clarifying Husserl’s notion of noema and its 
implications for his theory of sense. The leading question will be: How can 
noema play the role of both the sense and the objective correlate of the in-
tentional act? Also, I intend to point out the most important ways in which 
the notion of the noema becomes enriched, remaining at the same time 
the constant leitmotif after Husserl’s transcendental turn and the discov-
ery of the correlation between consciousness and the world. In this way I 
hope to outline the general theory of sense that Husserl’s phenomenology 
leaves us with as the task for the future.
1  This paper is the abridged and reworked version of my Master’s Thesis (“Husser’s 
Notion of the Noema: The Phenomenological Theory of Sense”) defended at KU Leuven 
in January 2016.
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I will start with presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl’s phenome-
nology and its evolution from his early theory of intentionality of the Logi-
cal Investigations (1900/1901) to the transcendental phenomenology and 
the discovery of the phenomenological reduction in the Ideas I (1913). 
These considerations will set the stage for the central part of my paper, 
devoted to the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noe-
ma. In chapter II, I will present two alternative views on the noema and 
measure the arguments of both sides against Husserl’s text from Ideas I. 
The questions left open by the debate will lead me to examine the role of 
non-linguistic, perceptual sense and linguistic, conceptual sense in consti-
tuting the identity of the intentional object, as well as the role of context in 
the constitution of sense. With this aim, in chapter III I will consider later 
Husserl’s notions of pre-predicative sense and the life-world, as developed 
in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis and Crisis of European 
Sciences, respectively. I will show how Husserl’s theory of sense in Ideas be-
comes in important ways supplemented by Husserl’s analyses of the inner 
and outer anticipatory horizons and the life-world as an all-encompassing 
horizon of all actual and possible objects. In this way, I hope to show that 
Husserl’s phenomenological theory of sense offers a valuable alternative 
to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.
I The Problematic of Sense in Husserl’s Phenomenology
Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900/1901), the work that marked the 
breakthrough of phenomenology, appeared in a philosophically turbulent 
period. Among the most urgent philosophical questions were those of the 
character of scientific knowledge, the foundation of a priori disciplines and 
the correct delimitation between natural and human sciences. Psycholo-
gy, understood as a natural science, was increasingly seen as capable of 
providing the foundation for other sciences, notably for logic and math-
ematics. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl vigorously criticized logical 
psychologism for confusing the ideal and necessary laws of logic with the 
empirical and merely probable psychological judgements about our mental 
states. Husserl’s initial interest in studying sense derives from his attempt 
to clarify meanings of logical laws and concepts and thus offer foundations 
for logic. With this task in mind, Husserl undertakes his investigation into 
the sense-giving activity of consciousness in general, in line with a concept 
his teacher Brentano introduced as the defining characteristics of mental 
phenomena: intentionality. 
In his major work, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano ar-
gued that psychology could be established as a rigorous science with the 
task of identifying, classifying and describing mental acts and their essen-
tial parts. By means of reflecting on our own mental life we discover that 
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mental phenomena (i.e. acts of consciousness such as judgments, beliefs, 
perceptions, wishes, hopes, fears, etc.) are always somehow directed to 
an object in a certain manner: “In presentation something is presented, in 
judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, 
in desire desired and so on.” (Brentano 2009: 68) Intentionality is this pe-
culiar directedness of acts of consciousness towards the objects intended 
in them. Brentano’s theory is often characterized as the object-theory of 
intentionality, because it apparently explains intentional directedness by 
introducing a new sort of object with a special ontological status, distinct 
from objects actually existing outside the mind. Namely, his notion of in-
tentional inexistence of objects in consciousness implies that intentional 
objects are somehow contained within the acts which intend them, and 
depend on them for their existence (Brentano 2009: 68).
Brentano’s discovery that all conscious mental processes had to be in some 
way intentional was Husserl’s main starting point in the development of 
his own phenomenological approach. However, dissatisfied with Brentano’s 
explanation of intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence of objects 
in consciousness, Husserl began to formulate his own view on intentional-
ity, which he would continue to develop and modify for the rest of his life. 
Criticizing Brentano’s idea that intentional objects are somehow present 
in consciousness, Husserl insists that “only one thing is present, the inten-
tional experience” and that a relation to an object is achieved solely in vir-
tue of the essential characteristics of this intentional experience itself, re-
gardless of the existence of any intentional object (1984: 386).2 In other 
words, components that make an act intentional are immanent to it, but 
the object itself is transcendent to it. The former Husserl calls ‘intentional 
content’, and the latter ‘intentional object’.
In the Vth Logical Investigation, Husserl outlines the basic structure of in-
tentionality in terms of the real (reell)3 phenomenological content of in-
tentional experience and the ideal, intentional content, in order to explain 
how intentional acts refer to their intended objects. For Husserl of the first 
edition of the Logical Investigations, phenomenology was supposed to de-
scribe essential immanent (reell) moments of the conscious experience it-
self, i.e. the phenomenological content of intentional experience, a study for 
which any reference to actual (real) intended objects must be completely 
irrelevant. With this task in mind, Husserl introduced the notion of inten-
tional content: that moment of the phenomenological content comprising 
2  All references to Husserl’s works cite the Husserliana edition. The translation I 
used is indicated in bibliography.
3  Husserl uses real to refer to actual worldly relations, things and states of affairs, 
and reell to refer to the essential immanent component parts of conscious experience: 
acts and sensuous material.
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everything that essentially belongs to the intentional experience as in-
tentional. Husserl disambiguates between several meanings of the notion 
(Husserl 1984: 413), most important of which for our purpose is intentional 
content as intentional matter.4 In his analysis of the immanent content by 
means of which an act is directed to an object, Husserl makes an essential 
distinction between the quality and the matter of an act: “the distinction 
between the general act-character which stamps it as being presentative, 
emotional, judgmental, etc. and its content which stamps it as presenting 
this, judging that, etc.” (1984: 425–426) The former is the quality, the lat-
ter is the matter of an act. The union of quality and matter of an inten-
tional act is called by Husserl the intentional essence, in opposition to the 
inessential moments of intentional experience, such as sensuous content.5 
Intentional matter can be shared by various intentional acts and “is that 
element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference 
so wholly definite that it not only fixes the object meant in a general way, 
but also the precise way in which it is meant.” (Husserl 1984: 426) Thus, 
matter seems to be both the immanent moment of the act and the determi-
nation of the object intended in the act. The question imposes itself: what 
is the ontological status of this peculiar component of phenomenological 
content which remains identical in many individual acts of consciousness 
and where exactly does its identity come from? Husserl’s turn away from 
the object and towards the immanent (reell) make-up of the intentional ex-
perience in accounting for intentionality makes it impossible for the iden-
tity of intentional matter to be attributed to the identity of the intended 
object itself (1984: 427). On the other hand, it cannot be explained by the 
peculiarities of individual acts either, for matter is precisely that in virtue 
of which particular acts intend the same object in the same determinate 
manner. The identical intentional matter has explanatory priority over in-
dividual acts and their intentions. Husserl’s position on this is best under-
stood if we compare his considerations regarding the meaning-conferring 
acts constitutive of the meaning of linguistic expressions in the Ist Logical 
Investigation: “(…) an expression only refers to an objective correlate be-
cause it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or name the ob-
ject through its meaning. An act of meaning is the determinate manner in 
which we refer to our object of the moment.” (Husserl 1984: 54) Meaning 
itself is a determinate logical content, a presentation (concept) of an object 
or a judgement about a relation, which remains identical in the multiplic-
ity of acts directed to it, i.e. it is an ideal species instantiated in the multi-
plicity of acts. (Husserl 1984: 102–105). Intentional directedness is thus 
4  The other two are intentional content as intentional object and intentional content 
as intentional essence.
5  Sensuous content (e.g. colors, sounds, odors, etc.) is inessential, because it is always 
changing and is different in every particular act.
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explained in virtue of ideal content of an act, mediating between an act 
and an object that the act intends. Intentional matter is the general name 
for this sense-component of an act whose identity is that of an ideal species 
(Husserl 1984: 430).6 Thus, for Husserl of the Logical Investigations sense 
is distinguished from object as an ideal entity enabling acts to refer to ob-
jects and Husserl treats it according to the model of linguistic meanings. 
The greatest problem with this view is whether it really explains the inten-
tional directedness of consciousness towards objects, or simply postulates a 
class of third realm Platonic entities somehow mysteriously related to acts 
on the one hand and objects on the other hand (Drummond 2002: 36).
Similar structures as just described reappear in Husserl’s mature theory of 
intentionality, although in a modified form, due primarily to Husserl’s dis-
covery of the phenomenological reduction as the authentic method for do-
ing phenomenology. The way we understand Husserl’s transition from the 
theory of intentionality offered in the Logical Investigations to the transcen-
dental phenomenology developed during Husserl’s Göttingen years, is cru-
cial for the correct assessment of his theory of sense. Ideas I (1913) marked 
the transcendental turn in Husserl’s philosophy, introducing Husserl’s theory 
of the constitution of objects in consciousness and the correlation between 
consciousness and the world. It is within this new transcendental frame-
work that Husserl advanced the notions of the noema and noesis for the 
first time in order to account for the fundamental structure of intentionality.
The phenomenological reduction designates a methodological turning away 
from the actual world of our everyday experience (the world of natural at-
titude) in which the proper field of phenomenological research becomes 
revealed. As phenomenologists we abstain from our claims about the out-
side world, we don’t use any theories that presuppose existence of objects 
of the outside world. Thus the new phenomenological attitude is opened 
to us: consciousness loses its empirical sense of something belonging to the 
world, and gains a new sense of an absolute sphere of ‘immanential’ being. 
“We have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute 
being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, ‘constitutes’ within 
itself, all worldly transcendencies.” (Husserl 1976: 107) Husserl points us 
towards the study of the pure, absolute, self-contained and world-consti-
tuting transcendental consciousness, and to the question of how the world 
is constituted in consciousness as the central phenomenological problem. 
According to Husserl, it is only by performing the reduction that we come 
to understand the essential intentional correlation of noesis and noema, 
6  On the ideality of meanings in the Logical Investigations see also Drummond 2002: 
35–37 and Rump (web) on the similarity between Husserl’s early theory of sense and 
Frege’s notion of Sinn.
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intentional acts and their objective correlates. Intentional act, the noesis, 
is ‘the sense-bestowing’ activity of consciousness: “ ‘To have sense’ or to ‘in-
tend to something’, is the fundamental characteristic of all consciousness 
which, therefore, is not just any mental living whatever, but is rather a men-
tal living having sense, which is noetic.” (Husserl 1976: 206) Both noetic 
acts as well as sensuous data (color, touch, tone, pleasure and pain, etc.) 
that serve as the material for their sense-bestowing activity (Husserl 1976: 
§ 85) belong to the real (reell) immanent parts of the stream of conscious-
ness, what Husserl of the Logical Investigations called ‘the phenomenological 
content’. Thus, in the Logical Investigations, Husserl was exclusively inter-
ested in the noetic side of intentionality, intentional acts with their quali-
ty and matter. However, Husserl now recognizes another essential compo-
nent in the structure of intentionality, namely the noematic component, the 
non-really inherent (Irreelles) moment of intentional experience. Husserl 
also uses other terms interchangeably with ‘noema’: ‘intended as intended’, 
‘intentional Object’ (in inverted commas) and ‘sense’ (Husserl 1976: 203). 
Still, the noema cannot be outrightly equated with Husserl’s earlier notion 
of sense as intentional matter, because it is consistently characterized, not 
as intentional content, but as the objective correlate of the intentional act. 
This in turn suggests that what remains left over in the sphere of pure im-
manence opened up by the phenomenological reduction is not simply a 
collection of the real (reell) components of conscious experience, but the 
entire intentional correlation between this experience and the object in-
tended in it. On the other hand, designating the noema as the sense of in-
tentional act implies that the noema is in some way abstract and distinct 
from the ordinary intended objects, even if not in the same way senses of 
the Logical Investigations are. The question arises therefore of how to bring 
together Husserl’s noticeable shift of interest towards a description of the 
intentional correlation, rather than noetic description only, with the theory 
of noemata as senses proposed in the Ideas I. Does the introduction of the 
noesis-noema correlation imply a shift in Husserl’s theory of sense as well?
Immediately after clarifying the distinction between the really inherent and 
the non-really inherent components of intentional experience, Husserl of-
fers an extremely important exemplary analysis of the perceptual noema 
in order to distinguish between it and the objects we encounter in the nat-
ural attitude. Husserl’s famous example is that of regarding with pleasure 
a blossoming apple tree in the garden. When we perceive an apple tree in 
the natural attitude, we see the tree as a material, spatio-temporal object, 
as a real object in the world. Only in the phenomenological attitude do we 
become explicitly aware of the noema of the tree. The tree that we expe-
rience as real (real) in the natural attitude loses its character of reality, or 
more precisely its reality becomes bracketed and through this bracketing 
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the noema emerges for us. Even though whilst we are in the phenomeno-
logical attitude we don’t posit the actual existence of the tree anymore, still 
the act of perception remains the act of perceiving something, it still has 
its objective correlate – its noema. Husserl makes a very clear distinction 
here between the noema and the object simpliciter, which seems to imply 
an ontological distinction between the two: “The tree simpliciter can burn 
up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense — the sense 
of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence — can-
not burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.” 
(Husserl 1976: 205) However, at the same time, Husserl points out that 
even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process is a per-
ceiving of “this blossoming apple tree, in this garden,” so that “everything 
remains as of old” (1976: 204). What makes the crucial difference is the 
change in attitude in which the object undergoes a radical modification of 
sense, allowing us to focus on the ‘perceived as perceived’, the ‘appearing 
as appearing’, to ‘something given in its essence’: the noema. Whereas it 
is clear that the object as intended is in fact the object of our intention, it 
is not completely clear whether in the natural attitude we intend the noe-
ma or not. The passage cited above strongly suggests that the noema is an 
abstract entity which we do not intend in the natural attitude. This poses 
question as to the relation between the noema and the object simpliciter.
Regarding the structure of the noema, Husserl distinguishes between the 
noematic core, the ‘meant Objectivity as meant’, the ‘pure objective sense’, 
the ‘noematic What’ on the one hand and, on the other hand, various no-
ematic characteristics (modes of giveness of an objectivity corresponding 
to the peculiarities of individual acts, e.g. differences in kinds of act, dif-
ferences in attention, etc.)7, all founded upon the central core. Like sens-
es of the Logical Investigations, the noematic core is something identical 
in different intentional acts, all intending the same thing (Husserl 1976: 
210–211). E.g. we can perceive, remember, detest or enjoy, the same book. 
The something identical (the book) in these essentially different acts is the 
noematic core. Husserl refers to the core component as the sense proper. 
Nevertheless, not only the core, but the noematic characteristics as well, 
are essential for the composition of a full, concrete and particular noema-
ta of each particular intentional act.
Reflecting back on his earlier one-sidedly noetic approach, Husserl sug-
gests that we should understand noematic core as the noematic cor-
relate of the notion of intentional matter from the Logical Investigations. 
7  For example, there is an entire array of essential differences between objects of 
remembering and perceived objects (making for example the former more doubtful 
and less precisely presented than the latter). See § 91 of the Ideas I.
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Correspondingly, we should understand characteristics as the noematic 
correlate of intentional quality, and “the full noesis related to the full noe-
ma as its intentional and full What” (Husserl 1976: 298).
Further investigation reveals that the core itself has a complex structure. 
The central noematic moment, also called ‘content’ by Husserl, is the pure 
X, abstract point of identity which functions as the bearer of changing pred-
icates, also belonging to the noematic core (Husserl 1976: 301).
Sense as the noematic core fixes the identity of the object in the multiplicity 
of acts in which it is presented. The full noema can also be understood as 
sense, and each individual act can be regarded as having a concrete, partic-
ular sense, but this particular sense is grounded in the identical core-sense.
Unlike the Logical Investigations, where the transcendent objectivity didn’t 
have a place in the phenomenological investigation at all, Husserl of the 
Ideas I is interested not only in the essence of the acts and other real compo-
nent parts of consciousness, but in the essence of their objective correlates 
as well. On the other hand, the problematic of identity remains of central 
importance for Husserl’s theory of sense both in the Logical Investigations 
and the Ideas I. Thus we see that one of the most important questions for 
Husserl turns out to be how it is the case that we are able to intend the 
same thing in various intentional acts. The problem of sense for Husserl is 
essentially related to this question.
I wish to point out several open questions concerning the noema, with 
which I will deal in the following chapter. 1. How should we interpret 
the enigmatic relationship between the noema and the intended object, 
whereby everything remains the same, yet becomes radically different? 
2. How should we understand the identification of the noema both with 
sense and with the objective correlate of the act? 3. Finally, how are we to 
account for the identity of the noematic sense throughout various inten-
tional experiences?
In the next chapter we will investigate how these questions were answered 
by the two opposed interpretations of the noema. In confronting and com-
paring the arguments, I hope the clear answer will emerge.
II The Noema Debate
In this chapter I want to focus on the debate revolving around the inter-
pretation of the noema, which represents two opposing views on the no-
ema and consequently two opposing views on intentionality. One of the 
main motives behind the debate is to understand how the noema is the 
sense of intentional act. With respect to this, two of the most important 
questions are 1. What is the ontological status of the noema? 2. What is 
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the role of the noema in intentionality? One side of the debate (sometimes 
called ‘West Coast’, or Fregean interpretation), inspired by Føllesdal, with 
Dreyfus, Smith and McIntyre as prominent figures, claims that the noema 
for Husserl is a new sort of object: an intentional object, ontologically dis-
tinct from the intended object, whose role is to mediate the relationship 
between acts of consciousness and their intended objects. For example, ac-
cording to this view, if I am perceiving a table, there are three elements in 
play, (1) the noetic element: my act of perception, (2) the intended object: 
the table itself which I am looking at (3) the noema, which is the sense of 
the table, by means of which our consciousness is intentionally directed to 
the table itself. The other side of the debate, whose main proponents are 
Aaron Gurwitsch, John Drummond and Robert Sokolowski (sometimes 
called the ‘East Coast’ interpretation), claims that the noema is in some 
way identical to the intended object, that there is no ontological difference 
between the object of intention and the noema, and that intentionality has 
two elements – an act and an object, without a third mediating element. 
I will begin the exposition of the debate with the Fregean interpretation, 
and then move on to the ‘East Coast’ interpretation.
A. The Fregean Interpretation
Føllesdal begins his influential paper “Husserl’s Notion of the Noema” with 
Brentano’s theory of intentionality and his unsatisfactory solution to the 
problem of non-existent intentional objects (e.g. centaurs, golden mountain, 
etc.). Namely, Brentano solves the problem by arguing that all intentional 
objects are immanent to consciousness, even if they do not exist in the real 
world. But then what about really existent objects of intention? The unde-
sired consequence of such object-theory of intentionality is that it reduces 
even the really existent objects to the immanent content of consciousness.
According to Føllesdal, Husserl’s theory of intentionality solves this  problem 
by strictly separating consciousness from its intended objects and intro-
ducing a third entity, the noema. “When we think of a centaur, our act of 
thinking has a noema, but it has no object; there exists no object of which 
we think. Because of its noema, however, even such an act is directed. To 
be directed simply is to have a noema.” (Føllesdal 1969: 681)
Føllesdal (1969) puts forward 12 theses on the noema, the most import-
ant of which are:
Thesis (1): “The noema is an intensional entity, a generalization of the no-
tion of meaning (Sinn, Bedeutung).” (681)
Thesis (3), stating that the noematic Sinn mediates the relation between 
consciousness and the object (682).
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Thesis (4): “The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e., the ob-
ject toward which the act is directed).” (682)
Thesis (8), stating that noemata are abstract entities, i.e. that they are 
non-real, non-spatial and non-temporal. As the textual support, Føllesdal 
refers to the previously mentioned distinction in Ideas I between the noe-
ma and the object simpliciter. (684)
Thesis (12), stating that the noema consists of two components, a complex 
conceptual pattern of determinations that makes sensuous data be the ap-
pearance of one identical object on the one hand, and various noematic 
characteristics on the other hand. (687)
If noema is a mediator, how are we to understand such mediation? Accord-
ing to this interpretation, in a way similar to Fregean senses.
We should note that an analogous dilemma to the one Føllesdal found 
in Brentano and Husserl, exists in the analytic tradition. It concerns the 
question of how we can have meaningful expressions about non-existent 
objects. This is the problem that Frege tried to solve in his classical paper 
“On Sense and Meaning”. The paper was written in 1892, a short time be-
fore the publication of the Logical Investigations. Its main topic is the prob-
lem of non-trivial statements of identity. Namely, Frege asks how we are 
to account for the fact that when we state the identity ‘a=a’ this is trivially 
true in virtue of a priori laws of logic, but when we state the identity ‘a=b’ 
this is a non-trivial a posteriori truth that can have added cognitive value. 
His answer is that “a difference can arise only if the difference between the 
signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the thing des-
ignated.” (Frege 1984: 158) According to Frege, a mode of presentation is the 
sense through which the thing is presented by a particular sign. Thus, besides 
having reference, signs (e.g. names) also have a sense. This allowed Frege 
to claim that sentences that refer to non-existent object can still be meaning-
ful, because even though they don’t have a referent, they still have a sense.
Sinn is objective and non-mental, strictly distinguished from ideas, which 
are merely subjective. We cannot share ideas, but we can share Sinn. Sense 
is not in the head, but neither is it somewhere in the external world. Rath-
er it belongs in the third Platonic realm. Thus, for Frege senses are ide-
al, non-spatiotemporal, ontologically distinct entities that mediate the re-
lationship between a name, a concept, or a proposition and its referent 
(Frege 1984: 160–161).
Returning to Føllesdal, we can now sum up his position in the following 
way: the noema is not a real object, but it is not a component of the inten-
tional act either, so it must be something else, an abstract entity mediating 
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the relation between the act and the object. Furthermore it is ontological-
ly very similar to Fregean senses, as an ideal content of consciousness (an 
intensional entity). In addition, Husserl can explain how intentional acts 
can intend non-existent objects in the same way Frege does: because the 
noema enables acts to refer to objects, thus giving them their intentional 
character, an act does not need to intend a real object in order to be inten-
tional. Because of these similarities, noemata are probably in important 
ways analogous to linguistic meanings.
This position was subsequently developed in greater detail by Føllesdal’s 
students, Smith and McIntyre. Going back to Husserl’s early theory of in-
tentionality, Smith and McIntyre see Husserl as offering a ‘content’ theo-
ry as opposed to the object theory in order to explain “how the content of 
an experience can succeed in relating it to an entity of some ordinary sort, 
such as a physical object.” (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 15) They stress that 
intentionality for Husserl is not to be explained by some peculiarity of in-
tentional objects, as if these were some special sort of objects, unlike ob-
jects of our everyday experience. On the contrary: “Husserl’s view is that 
the intentionality of an act is determined by the act’s own intrinsic charac-
ter, and for this reason it does not depend on what is actually true of the 
intended object or even its existence.” (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 92) Since 
acts have intentionality independently of the existence of their intended ob-
jects, the directedness of consciousness should be explained in virtue of the 
internal structure of the act itself. Accordingly, Smith and McIntyre under-
stand the phenomenological reduction as an ‘inward turn’, away from the 
intended objects, in which this internal structure of intentional experience 
is revealed. This reminds us of the early Husserl’s theory of sense, in which 
intentional matter, an essential moment of the internal structure of inten-
tional acts, played the role of directing them towards their intended objects.
Indeed, one of the important claims Smith and McIntyre defend, on which 
legitimacy of their interpretation depends, is that the noematic sense is the 
mature version of Husserl’s notion of intentional matter from the Logical 
Investigations. Like intentional matter, the noematic sense is an ideal mean-
ing-component of the act. The major change they see in Husserl’s theory of 
intentional content is that this meaning-component is no longer considered 
to be an essence instantiated in the multiplicity of individual acts, but an 
abstract particular entertained by the act:
“In Ideas, however, noemata are not act-essences, or universals, but ab-
stract entities of a different sort. As we shall see later, Husserl’s description 
of the inner structure of the specific Sinn-component of the noema seems 
to indicate that Sinne are a kind of abstract particulars; in particular, the 
Sinn of a direct object act is quite like the sense of a definite description 
on a Fregean theory of meaning.” (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 124)
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Like Føllesdal, Smith and McIntyre conceive of the relation between the in-
tended object and the noema in analogy with the way linguistic meanings 
prescribe objects to which they refer. According to them, every linguistic 
meaning is a noematic Sinn expressed and every noematic Sinn is in prin-
ciple expressible and therefore a linguistic meaning (Smith and McIntyre 
1982: 182–184).8 From this they draw the conclusion that noemata are in 
fact identical with the meanings of linguistic expressions and that when 
expressed in language they mediate the relation of words and referents in 
the manner of Fregean senses. The way a noematic sense, i.e. the determin-
able X and its predicates, determines an object can therefore be understood 
by comparing its structure with the structure of linguistic meanings. Smith 
and McIntyre find it most suitable to explain X as prescribing the object in 
the manner of direct reference, similar to the meaning of demonstratives 
such as ‘this’ and ‘that’, and the predicates as prescribing properties that 
the object is intended as having (1982: 213–214). However, the mean-
ing of demonstratives is determined by the context of the utterance, and 
the Sinn of perception by the physical context of perception. According to 
Smith and McIntyre, Husserl cannot account for this contextual factor in-
volved in intentionality because his notion of sense is limited only to the 
“abstract and eternal noematic content” of experience (1982: 216 – 219).
B. The East Coast Interpretation: John Drummond
The East Coast interpretation opposes the view defended by the Frege-
ans, that the noema has a mediating role between consciousness and its 
intended object. In discussing the East Coast interpretation I chose to fo-
cus on Drummond’s book Noema and Object: Husserlian Intentionality and 
Non-foundational Realism. I believe Drummond’s work to be representative 
of this side of the debate, because it comprehensively and uncompromising-
ly confronts the Fregean position on all the important points of the debate.
The argumentative line of this interpretation is centered on the claim that 
the noema is the phenomenologically reduced object, or in Drummond’s 
words: “The reduction merely changes the attitude with which we focus 
presumptively existent objects – rather than focusing some hidden class of 
intensional entities.” (Drummond 1990: 7) Noema is the object itself, mod-
ified by the phenomenological reduction. Drummond claims that Husserl 
defends a radically new version of the object theory of intentionality and 
that there is no ontological difference between intended and intentional 
objects. He supports his claim by several arguments.
First of all, the Fregean interpretation of the noema is motivated by the early 
Husserlian view of meaning and by the similarities of this view with Frege’s 
8  See also, Ideas I, § 124.
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theory of sense and reference. However we are not justified in transposing 
without reservations the views of early Husserl to the views of mature Hus-
serl, because Husserl significantly changed his view by the publication of 
Ideas I. Drummond does not deny that Husserl’s theory of the noema is an 
assimilation of his earlier theory of intentional content. However, he argues 
against the Fregeans that Husserl of the Ideas I introduced the intention-
al object in the sphere of phenomenological research. This allowed him to 
make the intentional object itself the bearer of identity in his explanation 
of how a multiplicity of acts can share an identical sense, the role previ-
ously played by the ideal intentional matter (Drummond 1990: 41–42).
Namely, Husserl consistently identifies the noema both with the intended 
object as intended and with the sense of intentional act. We should remind 
ourselves that precisely in those passages where Husserl distinguishes be-
tween the real object and the noema, he claims that even the phenomeno-
logically reduced mental process is the perceiving of this apple tree with 
all the same characteristics as in the natural attitude. Everything remains 
the same only modified. “The inverted commas surrounding ‘lovely’ and 
‘attractive’ within this text call upon us to consider these expressions as 
denoting sense-elements within the noema, but Husserl’s language clear-
ly suggests that sense-elements are in some manner the Objective proper-
ties themselves considered only insofar as they appear within this percep-
tion or act of liking.” (Drummond 1990: 117) Fregean interpretation runs 
into problems in explaining Husserl’s identification of sense and object in 
Ideas I. Fregeans simply argue that Husserl uses a misleading terminology. 
(Drummond 1990: 114, Smith and McIntyre 1984: 176) Drummond on the 
other hand, thinks that this identification indicates an important change 
in Husserl’s theory of sense. This change can only be correctly appreciated 
if we grasp the sense of Husserl’s transcendental turn and the true novelty 
of the phenomenological reduction.
By bracketing the existence of an object we can recognize the object as 
something belonging inseparably to the essence of this experience. That is 
also how the noema is distinct from the object simpliciter: it is the intend-
ed object, viewed in the phenomenological attitude, with respect to its es-
sential correlation with consciousness. We don’t have to make an ontolog-
ical distinction between noemata and objects in order to understand the 
abstract character of noemata. The noema is abstractly considered object, 
object considered in the phenomenological reduction, as the correlate of 
experience and apart from our positing or negating of its existence within 
the natural attitude.9
9  Consider also Drummond’s critique of the notion of abstract particular in Drum-
mond 1992: 89–110.
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However, Husserl does claim that the object is given in or through the 
sense.10 In order to explain why, Drummond appeals to Husserl’s use of the 
notion of ‘noematic intentionality’, as distinguished from the noetic one. 
Husserl mentions noematic intentionality in several places when he discuss-
es the noemata which have multiplicity of strata founded one on another. 
Noetic intentionality, Husserl says, ’’goes clear through the line of noematic 
intentionality.’’ Also: ‘’The Ego’s regard goes straight through the noemata of 
the sequence of levels, until it arrives at the Object of the ultimate level be-
yond which it cannot go, but upon which, instead, it fixes.’’ (Husserl 1976: § 
101) When Husserl mentions giveness of the object through sense he speaks 
in the context of the structure of the noema, and especially with respect to 
the relation of the full noema and its innermost moment: the pure deter-
minable X. The noematic sense itself includes a reference to its most fun-
damental noematic component. Husserl does not speak here of an abstract 
noema being directed to an external object (Drummond 1990: 135–138).
According to Drummond the sense of the act for Husserl is the object itself 
as it is given in the act. The sense of a particular concrete act then would 
be the full, concrete noema, complex acts would have layers of sense, com-
posed of many objectivities all united in one identical object. Also, we can 
view noemata in abstraction from the kind of act in which they are pre-
sented: this is when we regard the noematic core which can be identical in 
different acts, so that we can say that these acts all intend the same object. 
In conclusion, Drummond describes sense as the significance of the object 
for consciousness. “The noema, therefore, is the intended objectivity just 
as intended with all its significance for us, in its relation to our animating 
interests and concerns, but apart from our participation in the general be-
lief characteristic of the natural attitude, i.e. apart from the naïve accep-
tance of the factual existence of these objectivities and the validity of our 
judgments and evaluations thereof.” (Drummond 1990: 106)
C. What is the Noema?
The main support in favor of the Fregean interpretation is to be found in 
Husserl’s separation of the noema and the intended object in § 88 of Ideas 
I. Together with the fact that an act can intend a non-existent entity, and 
the similarity in the structure of the noema and that of the intentional es-
sence of the Logical Investigations (Husserl himself compares sense-core 
and noematic characteristics with matter and quality of the Investigations), 
this leads Fregeans to conclude that the noema is an abstract, ideal entity, 
10  “The noema in itself has an objective relation and, more particularly, by virtue of 
its own ‘sense.’ ” (Husserl 1976: 296) “Each noema has a “content” that is to say, its 
“sense,” and is related through it to ‘its’ object.” (Husserl 1976: 297)
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ontologically distinct from the thing intended, mediating between act and 
object, thus making intentional directedness possible.
Drummond replied by stressing the role of the phenomenological reduc-
tion – the change of attitude that makes it possible to grasp the object as 
the noema: the objective correlate of the act. Textual evidence in favor of 
Drummond’s view is also pretty strong. Husserl frequently calls the noe-
ma ‘intended object as intended’, object put in inverted commas, in paren-
theses, and consistently contrasts the object simpliciter in an unmodified 
sense with the noema as the object modified by the phenomenological re-
duction. All this points to the understanding of the noema as the phenom-
enologically reduced object.11
In my opinion, Drummond’s interpretation has more credibility for sever-
al reasons.
First, it is misguided to suppose that shortcomings in Brentano’s explana-
tion of how non-real objects are intended led Husserl to introduce a new 
entity. I don’t think that Husserl’s motivation for introducing the noema is 
an attempt to account for the cases where there is no real object of inten-
tion. Husserl has no problem stating that we can grasp non-real objects, 
i.e. essences we grasp in eidetic intuition, numbers in corresponding ar-
ithmetical attitude, we have phantasized objects as objects of phantasyz-
ing act, and so on. Husserl even states that an object is always somehow 
posited, even when its existence is negated (1976: 244). Husserl’s task is 
to carefully describe how each kind of object is given in its corresponding 
kind of act. This suggests that Husserl has a very different approach to the 
problem of intentionality than the one posed in the analytic tradition, of 
how to explain meaning of expressions without referent. For Husserl there 
are no intentional acts without objects. Therefore, it is a mistake to claim 
that, according to Husserl, “when we think of a centaur, our act of think-
ing has a noema but it has no object”. I believe that it would be more in 
line with Husserl’s view to say that the object of intention in this case is a 
centaur, posited in the particular act of imagining. But the same centaur 
is the noema of this act, when viewed with respect to the essential cor-
relation between the act and the object. Fregeans are struggling to under-
stand what it means to disregard the existence of objects, for they think 
that this must automatically lead us inward, to a consciousness without ob-
jects. In a sense they are demonstrating how difficult it can be to abandon 
the natural attitude, for instead of disregarding the existence and non-ex-
istence of objects they are arguing from the non-existence of objects that 
the structure of intentional experience must involve some sort of abstract 
11  One of the clearest formulations in favor of this interpretation can be found in 
§ 97 of the Ideas I.
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mediating sense. But the point is to phenomenologically describe the dif-
ferences we encounter when we intend something existent and when we 
intend something non-existent, as well as when something we intended as 
existent becomes doubtful, confirmed, etc. or vice versa when something we 
intended as non-existent turns out to be existent after all. Although Hus-
serl attempted to explain intentional directedness solely in virtue of really 
inherent moments of intentional acts in the Logical Investigations, later he 
moved towards a theory that stresses the correlation of the act and object. 
Thus I agree with Sokolowski when he says: “Smith and McIntyre want to 
use the noema as a device that would explain how consciousness becomes 
intentional. But Husserl’s philosophy is not explanatory in this way; it does 
not provide devices, it merely describes.” (1987: 527)
We see how by relying too much on the Logical Investigations Fregeans risk 
to neglect or misinterpret the role of the phenomenological reduction in 
understanding the notion of the noema. Smith and McIntyre argue that the 
epoché brackets the existence of objects, which is correct, but they continue 
to claim that Husserl made a turn inward in which only the content that 
belongs to consciousness is revealed. Consequently they interpret Husserl 
as an internalist, interested only in the structure of acts of consciousness, 
independently of their intended objects. This interpretation does not square 
well with the transcendental turn. Fregean interpretation fails to appreciate 
the entire moment of the correlation between consciousness and object, 
whereby the world, although bracketed, remains as a pure phenomenon 
for consciousness. We don’t turn away from the world in order to reveal 
something that has nothing to do with it, we are performing the epoché 
precisely in order to see that the world of our everyday natural attitude is 
constituted in the transcendental consciousness.
Finally, I don’t agree with the linguistic interpretation offered by Smith and 
McIntyre, for two reasons. First, I don’t think it has confirmation in the text 
of Ideas I. The expressibility thesis, as Drummond also points out (1990: 
189–191) does not imply that noemata are ontologically identical entities 
with linguistic meanings. Rather it simply means that the same object in-
tended in a non-expressive act can become an object of a new, expressive 
act. This can even indicate that objective senses of non-expressive acts 
serve as grounds for the meanings of linguistic expressions, for we need 
first to have an object in an act of intuition in order to be able to formulate 
a concept and express it in language. Second, I don’t think that anything 
is accomplished if we explain the noema by reducing it to Fregean senses, 
because what remains is an equally mysterious third realm. This does not 
really explain even linguistic meanings. In other words, we are back to the 
problems Investigations left us with. Fregean interpretation, with the no-
ema as an abstract particular, does not solve this problem. It leaves us in 
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the dark equally as Husserl’s early theory as to the nature of the relation 
between the noema and the act. It is different from the Investigations only 
because now senses are in some other unexplained way related to the act, 
not as essences, but as correlates. In the following chapter I will attempt to 
outline what I believe to be Husserl’s alternative to the exclusively linguis-
tic theory of sense, the one that regards sense as a general phenomenon, 
but that nevertheless includes linguistic sense under its scope.
What is the noema? The time has come to answer the three questions posed 
at the end of chapter I:
1. Regarding the relationship between the noema and the intended object 
I agree with Drummond that the noema is the intended object itself when 
we regard it, not simply ‘taking it for granted’ the way we do in everyday 
natural attitude, but in the phenomenological attitude, i.e. when we pay 
attention to the object as intended in the act.
2. The noema is the meaningful object constituted in the activity of con-
sciousness, in its endeavor to make sense of the world. The objects we en-
counter are meaningful in virtue of us giving them the sense they have for 
us. Sense is a constitutive element of objects themselves, but all objects 
are always objects for consciousness. The objects in the world can have 
various senses for various subjects and with respect to various intentions. 
For example, they can have practical sense if they can be used to achieve 
practical goals, or theoretical sense when we are using them to build the-
ories. Fundamentally, things always have sense of identical objects of our 
many intentions. If it weren’t for sense-bestowing acts that constitute them 
as identical, things wouldn’t have sense of things anymore. 
3. However, the question of the constitution of this identical noematic core 
remains open in the Ideas I. I am picking up on this question in the follow-
ing chapter in the context of the later Husserl’s analyses of sense-consti-
tution. At the same time, we will see that this question is in an important 
way linked to the question of the relation between the non-linguistic per-
ceptual sense and the linguistic, conceptual sense. Are we supposed to un-
derstand the perceptual noemata and sense-bestowing acts as the ‘labor of 
the concept’, such is Føllesdal’s pattern of determinations or demonstrative 
reference coupled with predicates, as Smith and McIntyre suggested, or is 
the perceptual experience essentially different from the activity of deter-
mining objects by means of concepts?
The change in Husserl’s approach to intentionality is usually described 
as his development from static (Ideas I), to genetic (Analyses Concerning 
Passive and Active Syntheses, Formal and Transcendental Logic) and finally 
generative phenomenology (Crisis). After the Ideas I the phenomenological 
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reduction led Husserl to study the origins of sense at a passive, pre-cogni-
tive and pre-predicative level of consciousness and the manner in which 
sense-bestowing activities of consciousness are grounded in the surround-
ing life-world. Following this trail will also allow me to respond to the pre-
viously mentioned critique of Husserl for his alleged failure to take into 
account contextual factors in accounting for intentionality. We will see that 
Husserl’s phenomenology gives us a useful theoretical tool to study the 
contextual dimension of sense.
III Linguistic and Non-linguistic Sense
In the 1920s Husserl held series of lectures on transcendental logic, widely 
known as the lectures on passive synthesis. These lectures mark Husserl’s 
development from static to genetic analyses of consciousness and anticipate 
his late generative phenomenology (Steinbock 2001: xvi).  Throughout the 
lectures Husserl devotes special attention to the passive syntheses in per-
ception as constitutive of the fundamental sphere of pre-giveness: a neces-
sary foundation for all the higher acts of consciousness.
When perceiving an external, spatio-temporal object, we always see the 
object only from one side. However, even though the whole spatio-tem-
poral object is not given genuinely in the present perception, other sides 
are always emptily co-intended with the side that is genuinely perceived, 
so that the full thing, not just a side of it, is the objective correlate of our 
perception:
“Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that 
presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an 
empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions. In a noematic 
regard, what is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that a 
particular giveness refers to something else that is not given, as what is 
not given belonging to the same object.” (Husserl 1966: 5)
External perception is not simply an originarily presentive act, it essential-
ly includes empty, indeterminate anticipatory intentions, which neverthe-
less “prescribe a rule for the transition to new actualizing appearances.” 
(Husserl 1966: 6) The full perceptual noema is not simply the thing that 
we perceive in the present moment. Of necessity, the latter must fit in with 
the possibilities of sense prescribed by its inner and outer anticipatory hori-
zons: constantly changing patterns of possible new determinations of the 
thing, as well as of its relations to other things, in which it is more or less 
vaguely predetermined which appearances can function as further deter-
minations of the thing, and which cannot. Because our perceptual expe-
rience is essentially incomplete, perceptual object (perceptual noema) is 
never a fixed, stable unity – it always has horizons of possible new senses. 
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Explanation of intentional structure of external perception and the role of 
intentional horizons in it requires temporal analysis. Horizons are the work 
of a constant process of anticipating intentions, always directed towards a 
system of new, not yet determined moments of a given object. At the same 
time, horizons anticipate what can appear in the surrounding background 
of the momentarily intended object. Sense becomes fulfilled in time, and 
empty inner and outer horizons point to what can be integrated concor-
dantly in the progressive fulfillment of sense. Along with the anticipation 
continuous retention is at work, so that previously fulfilled intentions are 
retained in the present one as well. In other words, in passing over to a 
new perception of an object, we don’t forget what we earlier perceived. 
Perception is a flux, extended in time, “where appearances concordantly 
pass into one another and form the unity of coincidence corresponding to 
the unity of sense.” (Husserl 1966: 8)
But there is also the possibility of a break in this series of fulfilling acts. 
Such ‘disappointment’ occurs when our anticipations unexpectedly fail, i.e. 
when a new appearance of an object does not fit in with its pre-determined 
horizons of sense. Occurrence of disappointment further determines the 
sense of the entire object, since the new, non-anticipated determination 
becomes integrated in the totality of the sense of the object (Husserl 1966: 
26). Anticipatory horizons of perception related to this object are accord-
ingly modified and the sense of the whole is ‘reinterpreted’ on a passive 
level so as to conform to the new occurrence. Thus even the horizons them-
selves are temporally constituted in the course of experience.
The perceptual horizons are not concept-like patterns of determinations, 
however. They are much more fluid and indeterminate. Only later some 
of these passively intended and rather vague determinations become con-
ceptually fixed. The ideal and linguistically expressible conceptual senses 
constituted in the higher level acts, such is judgement, also play crucial 
role in the constitution of objective sense. Even though conceptual senses 
are made possible on the basis of fluid acts of constitution on the percep-
tual level, it is these that really enable us to recognize identical objects in 
the multiplicity of appearances. As Sokolowski explains:
“A fixed sense which has the consistency and solidity to reappear in  different 
acts as the same ideal entity appears for the first time in judgment. We 
might say that “concepts” arise only in judgments. Before the categorical 
act of judging takes place, there are only the fluid anticipations of mean-
ing or sense, but such anticipations are not the same as fixed senses. They 
are only the “lived” pre-conceptual or pre-categorical foreshadowing of the 
type of object we call a sense, and they can be understood only teleologi-
cally, that is, in function of the terminal sense they anticipate. There is no 
crystallized meaning in pre-predicative encounter.” (1970: 172)
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I slightly depart from this explanation of the relation between the percep-
tual and the conceptual dimensions of experience, in that I find that per-
ceptual experience already relates us to the perceived object in a mean-
ingful way, even if we still have no concept of it. The perceptual noema is 
already a meaningful object. Its identity is fluid, but the sense-bestowing 
activity of anticipation and retention has already begun. On the other hand, 
admitting that only concepts can give us fixed identical senses is not a re-
turn to the mediator theory, because the relation between perceptual ob-
ject and intentional act is not necessarily mediated by a concept enabling 
an act to refer to its object. Even if the concepts are actually incorporat-
ed in our perceptual experience, which is often the case (e.g. we perceive 
houses, dogs, cats, etc. without having to go through the entire process of 
constitution of concepts for each individual house, dog or cat), the per-
ceptual sense includes much more than the concept prescribes. The entire 
perceived object with its ever changing inner and outer horizons of sense 
is the full noematic correlate of the perceptual act.
Unlike the noema of the Ideas I, the objective sense is now understood as be-
coming constituted in time. Husserl replaces the static analysis of essential 
structures with the dynamic analysis of the very process of sense-constitu-
tion. This change however should be understood as building upon previous 
grounds, where previous results are further explored, rather than rejected.
In response to the analysis of the intentionality of perception offered by 
Smith and McIntyre, we can bring ourselves to see that for Husserl percep-
tion does not refer in the manner of an empty demonstrative ‘this’. It in-
tends its object by ‘articulating’ content given in the perceptual experience, 
according to the laws of the passive temporal and associative synthesis. 
Perceptual sense is also not to be equated with conceptual sense. Although 
conceptual sense is the sense in the pregnant meaning of the term, the 
identical unity in the multiplicity of acts, perceptual sense constitutes the 
ground for the conceptual sense. Our activity of conceptual determining, 
of attributing concepts to things, runs parallel with a different and more 
original mode of experience, that of immediate intuition. Husserl’s con-
siderations aim to show that we have a pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic 
recognition of objects around us on the basis of passive synthesis, an in-
tentionality that unifies, distinguishes, associates, determines, recognizes, 
retains and anticipates without us being explicitly conscious of it.
Finally, in response to the critique by Smith and McIntyre, arguing that 
Husserl cannot account for the contextual element of intentionality, I wish 
to briefly point out another important moment in the constitution of sense, 
the one Husserl explores in his latest work, The Crisis of European sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology. The sense-bestowing, noetic activity 
is multifarious, not only because there is an immense plurality of ways in 
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which subjective consciousness can have objects for itself, but also because 
it is the matter of intersubjective constitution of sense in the pre-given life-
world, the world of everyday life and praxis. Objects are meaningful even 
when we don’t pay attention to the correlation at all, when we are simply 
engaged with them. Their sense is partly pre-given, for we are born into 
the already meaningful world, and we appropriate the network of senses 
already constituted in our community. Every sense of a particular thing, 
every sense-bestowing activity of particular acts of consciousness are made 
possible only against the background of already pre-given horizon of pos-
sible senses that is the life-world. Each of us is a transcendental ego, con-
stituting the world, each of us has the multiplicity of horizons of various 
worldly objects, all grounded in the totality of the one world-horizon. In 
living together, our horizons overlap, mutually support and correct each 
other. The world in which we live is therefore the correlate of the transcen-
dental intersubjectivity (Husserl 1962: 171).
After everything that has been said so far, I don’t think I should dwell on 
this point for too long: study of inner and outer horizons as well as the 
study of the life-world is the study of context. Partial horizons and the 
unifying horizon of the world as a whole provide a constant orientation 
for our meaningful activities. The study of context can be applied in all 
the fields with which we are meaningfully engaged, in order to disclose 
the hidden presuppositions that enable this particular domain to acquire 
its sense. Once again we see how inappropriate it is to reduce horizons of 
meaningfulness to conceptual patterns, or sets of possible descriptions of 
object. The possibility of these descriptions and conceptualizations is itself 
grounded in the life of consciousness, in the sedimented past experience, 
as well as in the anticipation of further experiences, whose dynamic in-
terplay constitutes the all-encompassing, changing horizon of the world.
Conclusion
From the early beginnings in the Logical Investigations to his latest works, 
the central concern of Husserl’s phenomenology is the theory of sense. Hus-
serl made a long way from his original theory of senses as ideal meanings 
instantiated in intentional acts. The transcendental turn and the phenom-
enological description of the essential correlation between consciousness 
and object opened the possibility of a more general, more fundamental the-
ory of sense than the study of linguistic meanings could ever offer. Husserl 
kept enriching his transcendental-phenomenological theory of sense to in-
clude a theory of sense-constitution on the pre-predicative level of percep-
tion, the role of the anticipatory horizons in providing framework for all 
meaningful encounters of consciousness and the world and the life-world 
as the most general horizon of sense. Husserl’s phenomenology sets before 
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us a theoretical task to develop further a theory of sense that would be 
more encompassing than the linguistic theory of meaning, but that would 
on the other hand also take into account the essentially linguistic dimen-
sion of our experience.
Language has great importance in the constitution of sense. Indeed, re-
garding the general question ‘how words mean something?’ fruitful en-
counters are possible between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, 
which undoubtedly makes great progress in various domains of language 
analysis. However, as I tried to show, the sense should not be understood 
solely as the meaning of words and sentences, nor exclusively as the ac-
complishment of consciousness that thinks with concepts. I would like to 
suggest that Husserl’s decisive contribution to the theory of sense is to be 
found in the focus he places on the study of sense as it is constituted in 
all the multifarious interrelations of consciousness and the world, which 
go far beyond the linguistic phenomena. For example, the sense of a cer-
tain monument for a certain local community is constituted in that com-
munity with respect to the sense of a historical event that the monument 
marks, in the horizon of the past in which this event played a significant 
role in their common life-world (as a triumph, a tragedy, a beginning of a 
revolution, etc). The sense somebody’s letter has for me extends beyond 
the meaning of words and sentences written in it, encompassing my rela-
tionship with that person whether it is a long-lost relative, a friend send-
ing me a postcard, or simply somebody advertising his products to me. 
In everyday life we constantly encounter meaningful things and engage 
in meaningful activities. We could say, our lives are constantly meaning-
ful in virtue of us constituting it as such, even if for the most part we are 
not even aware of this constant sense-bestowing activity. The most gen-
eral question of the theory of sense inspired by Husserl’s phenomenology 
is: what makes it possible for us to enter in all these meaningful relations 
with the world around us? This can include various particular studies of 
what makes it possible for us to recognize particular types of things in the 
world with the particular types of sense they have, use them for various 
activities, feel something about them, set goals for ourselves or with oth-
ers, etc. Included within this general theory of sense are also the problems 
I discussed in the previous chapter with respect to the perceptual sense of 
the objects, how it makes possible the conceptual sense and how, on the 
other hand, the perception itself takes over the conceptual content. Also, 
Husserl’s phenomenological theory of sense opens the possibility to study 
the sense of historical processes, intricate changes in the way we relate to 
things in the world and other human beings in the course of our lives and 
in the course of generations. We should also mention the phenomenolog-
ical study of the sense of scientific concepts and methods by explicating 
their ground in the activities of the life-world and our lived experience.
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Whenever we ask about sense in the manner indicated above, whichever 
particular investigation we choose to engage into (needless to say, those 
indicated above do not comprise the full list), we should ask about subject 
for which an object has such-and-such a sense and how this sense becomes 
constituted for the subject. In the Ideas I Husserl made a breakthrough from 
the theory of meanings as mediators towards a general study of sense. The 
decisive step enabling Husserl to do this was his theory of the correlation 
between intentional acts (noeses) and their intended objects (noemata). 
The lesson I think we should learn from Husserl’s phenomenology is that 
the category of sense should be kept separated from that of linguistic mean-
ing. Sinn should be understood as something different from Bedeutung, 
because we can truly understand Bedeutung only on the basis of the more 
general study of Sinn.
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Olga Nikolić
Huserlova teorija noematičkog smisla
Apstrakt
Nakon transcendentalnog obrta i otkrića korelacije između svesti i sveta (Ideje 
za čistu fenomenologiju i fenomenološku filozofiju) pojam noeme postaje jedan od 
stalnih motiva Huserlove filozofje. Moj rad će se baviti razjašnjenjem ovog pojma 
i implikacijama koje on ima za Huserlovu teoriju smisla. Vodeće pitanje će biti: 
zašto Huserl shvata noemu istovremeno kao smisao i kao objektivni korelat in-
tencionalnog akta? Najpre ću predstaviti problematiku smisla u Huserlovoj fe-
nomenologiji od Logičkih istraživanja do Ideja I. Centralni deo rada biće posvećen 
uticajnoj debati o interpretaciji noeme. Nakon toga ću istaći najvažnije momen-
te Huserlovog kasnijeg shvatanja noeme, kao i razlike između jezičkog i nejezič-
kog smisla, pre svega u Predavanjima o pasivnoj i aktivnoj sintezi. Na taj način 
nameravam da pokažem da Huserlova fenomenološka teorija smisla predstavlja 
vrednu alternativu isključivo jezički orijentisanim teorijama smisla. 
Ključne reči: Huserl, noema, smisao, korelacija, transcendentalna fenomenologija.
